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Missed Opportunity or Dodged Bullet? The Tenth 
Circuit’s Non-decision in Rocky Mountain Christian 
Church v. Board of County Commissioners  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County 
Commissioners,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit considered whether Boulder County officials violated the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act2 (“RLUIPA”) 
when it denied the Rocky Mountain Christian Church’s (“Rocky 
Mountain” or “RMCC”) special use application, which would have 
allowed RMCC to expand its Boulder County facilities.3 In a 
relatively straightforward application of RLUIPA’s statutory 
language, the court concluded that Boulder County had violated 
RLUIPA’s requirement that Rocky Mountain’s permit be considered 
on “equal terms” with secular institutions in the application process 
and that, as a religious institution, Rocky Mountain should be free 
from exclusion or unreasonable limitations on its assemblies or 
structures within the county.4 
This Note argues that although the Tenth Circuit correctly 
decided Rocky Mountain, the case will have limited precedential 
value for two reasons. First, the case’s procedural posture and the 
county’s failure to raise key issues and arguments on appeal severely 
limited the court’s ability to review the district court’s decision. 
Second, while the court touched on two important issues that have 
caused circuit splits over the correct interpretation of RLUIPA’s 
equal terms provision, the court ultimately, albeit prudently, failed to 
weigh in decisively on these issues.  
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In 1978, Boulder County took affirmative steps to “curb[] urban 
sprawl, maintain[] open space to preserve the county’s rural 
 
 1. 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2006). 
 3. Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1233. 
 4. Id. at 1236–40. 
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character, and sustain[] agriculture” by enacting its comprehensive 
plan (“Comprehensive Plan”).5 Pursuant to the Comprehensive Plan, 
the County Land Use Code designated certain areas as “Agricultural 
Districts.”6 Within the Agricultural Districts, “offices, warehouses, 
and retail stores are prohibited,” and all facilities with “occupancy 
loads exceeding 100 people [must] apply for a special use permit.”7 
The county used numerous criteria when deciding whether to grant 
a special use application, including whether the proposed use was in 
“accordance with the comprehensive plan, and not an over-intensive 
use of land or excessive depletion of natural resources.”8 
Although located in an agricultural district, RMCC’s fifty-five 
acre campus shares proximity with a number of structures and 
facilities. These include several subdivisions, “a wastewater treatment 
facility, a high school, and the 500,000 square foot Boulder 
Technology Center.”9 RMCC’s facilities consist of a 106,000 square 
foot main building, a maintenance building, and numerous 
temporary modular units.10 The size of RMCC’s current facilities are 
the result of gradual expansion since its founding in 1984 and two 
successful applications for special use permits, which allowed Rocky 
Mountain to increase the size of its buildings to their present 
dimensions.11 
RMCC submitted the special use application at issue in Rocky 
Mountain in 2004 and “met opposition at each level of review.”12 
Despite RMCC’s efforts to scale back its proposed expansion after 
initial opposition, the county partially denied RMCC’s modified 
application, allowing RMCC to expand only its main worship 
building and replace their temporary modular units with a small 
permanent building.13 Shortly thereafter, RMCC sued Boulder 
County under RLUIPA in district court. At the close of RMCC’s 
 
 5. Id. at 1233. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 1233–34 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 9. Id. at 1234. Neither the high school nor the Boulder Technology Center are subject 
to the requirements of the Comprehensive Plan. Id. at 1234 n.1 (“The high school is not 
subject to the County’s zoning authority and the Boulder Technology Center’s industrial 
zoning district predates the Comprehensive Plan.”). 
 10. Id. at 1234. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at 1235. 
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evidence, the county moved for judgment as a matter of law under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a).14 The court denied the 
motion on all issues but the county’s affirmative defenses, which the 
court deferred.15 Ultimately, “[a]fter a twelve-day trial, the jury 
found for RMCC” under RLUIPA’s equal terms, unreasonable 
limitations, and substantial burden provisions.16 Although the jury 
awarded RMCC no damages, the court “entered a permanent 
injunction requiring the County to approve RMCC’s special use 
application” and “denied the County’s renewed motion for 
judgment as a matter of law.”17 The county appealed.18 
III. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. General Provisions of RLUIPA 
Congress enacted RLUIPA to protect individuals from “land use 
regulation that would impose a substantial burden on the person’s 
free exercise of religion.”19 A substantial burden will invalidate a 
regulation unless the government can demonstrate that the burden 
“is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling 
governmental interest.”20 In addition to the substantial burden 
provision, RLUIPA identifies and prohibits three other “categories” 
of discriminatory government conduct. First, under the equal terms 
provision, the government may not “implement a land use 
regulation in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution 
on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.”21 Second, under the nondiscrimination provision, 
RLUIPA prohibits religious discrimination against any assembly or 
institution when implementing land use regulations.22 Finally, under 
the exclusion and limits provision, “[n]o government shall impose or 
implement a land use regulation that: (A) totally excludes religious 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. John J. Dvorske, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Operation of Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 181 A.L.R. FED. 247 (2010). 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). 
 21. Id. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
 22. Id. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
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assemblies from a jurisdiction; or (B) unreasonably limits religious 
assemblies, institutions, or structures within a jurisdiction.”23 
B. Interaction Between RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause 
Although RLUIPA is a relatively new statute, key issues have 
already emerged regarding the interaction between the 
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause24 and the equal terms provision 
of RLUIPA.25 First, circuit courts disagree about whether courts may 
weigh the nature of the challenged action against the government’s 
regulatory interest, which would essentially provide an affirmative 
defense for the government in RLUIPA cases.26 The second 
important issue courts face is “whether the equal terms provision 
contains a ‘similarly situated’ requirement.”27 
1. What level of scrutiny, if any, should the court apply to government 
action under RLUIPA? 
The Third and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals are at odds as 
to whether RLUIPA allows non-neutral government actions to stand 
so long as they pass strict scrutiny. In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town 
of Surfside,28 the Eleventh Circuit answered that question in the 
affirmative. The court held that the Town of Surfside violated 
RLUIPA when it denied special use permits to two Orthodox Jewish 
congregations.29 Both congregations had been meeting in the 
business district until the town denied one of the groups a special 
business permit to continue operating in its location.30 Neither 
group attempted to reapply for a variance or to relocate because only 
 
 23. Id. § 2000cc(b)(3) (emphasis added). The Rocky Mountain court discussed only the 
second prong of the exclusion and limits provision, referring to RLUIPA’s prohibition on 
regulation that unreasonably limits religious assemblies as the “unreasonable limitations” 
provision. The remainder of this Note employs this shorthand label. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 25. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368 (7th 
Cir. 2010); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 
1237 (10th Cir. 2010); Sarah Keeton Campbell, Comment, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
Provision, 58 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1086–93 (2009). 
 26. Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1237. 
 27.  Id. at 1238. 
 28. 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 29. Id. at 1219. 
 30. Id. at 1220. 
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one zoning district allowed churches, and they claimed that no 
suitable land was available in that district.31 The town maintained 
that its strict zoning of the business district was required to maintain 
a strong tax base and that it could not afford to place noneconomic 
establishments there without risking economic instability.32 
The court looked to the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence to determine what level of scrutiny, if any, RLUIPA 
afforded the town’s interest in its strict zoning policy. The court 
concluded that RLUIPA codified the Supreme Court’s Smith-
Lukumi precedent that requires courts to strictly scrutinize any 
ordinance that is not both neutral and generally applicable.33 By 
treating the synagogues differently than similarly situated secular 
assemblies, the town’s ordinance was neither neutral nor generally 
applicable. Through the lens of strict scrutiny, the town’s ordinance 
neither furthered compelling governmental interests, nor was it 
narrowly tailored to further those interests.34 The court reasoned that 
the “proffered interests of retail synergy [were] not pursued against 
analogous nonreligious conduct [e.g., meeting in a private club], and 
those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that do not 
improperly distinguish between similar secular and religious 
assemblies.”35 
By contrast, the Third Circuit has rejected the notion that 
RLUIPA allows a non-neutral ordinance to survive even though it 
withstands strict scrutiny. In Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. 
v. City of Long Branch,36 the court concluded “that RLUIPA’s Equal 
Terms provision operates on a strict liability standard; strict scrutiny 
does not come into play.”37 The court based this conclusion on the 
“clear divide” between the substantial burden provision, which 
expressly includes the balancing test in the statutory language, and 
 
 31. Id. at 1220–21. 
 32. Id. at 1221–22. 
 33. Id. at 1232 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520 (1993); Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 
superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (Notably, the Supreme Court has invalidated RFRA as applied to 
states and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Congress has 
since amended RFRA through the RLUIPA.). 
 34. Rocky Mountain, 613 F.3d at 1235. 
 35. Id. 
 36. 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 37. Id. at 269 (emphasis added). 
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the equal terms provision, which does not.38 The court 
acknowledged that its conclusion parted ways with the Eleventh 
Circuit. The court reasoned that although it agreed with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s “deference to Congress’s intent to codify the 
[Supreme Court’s] Free Exercise precedent,” the statutory language 
manifested Congress’s intent to exclude a strict scrutiny analysis from 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.39 As such, the court held that “if a 
land use regulation treats religious assemblies or institutions on less 
than equal terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions that are 
no less harmful to the governmental objectives in enacting the 
regulation, that regulation—without more—fails under RLUIPA.”40 
2. Does the equal terms provision contain a “similarly situated” 
requirement? 
Once again, the Third and Eleventh Circuits have squared off in 
determining to what extent RLUIPA’s equal terms provision 
requires religious organizations, in order to establish a violation, to 
identify a similarly situated nonreligious comparator that had been 
treated favorably.41 In Lighthouse, discussed above, the Third Circuit 
concluded that “the Equal Terms provision does in fact require . . . a 
secular comparator that is similarly situated as to the regulatory 
purpose of the regulation in question—similar to First Amendment 
Free Exercise jurisprudence.”42 As a result, the city’s regulation 
would violate the equal terms provision only if it treated religious 
groups worse than secular groups “that are similarly situated as to the 
[City’s stated] regulatory purpose.”43 This led the court to conclude 
 
 38. See id. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a), with id. § 2000cc(b). 
 39. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 269.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Implied from the language of the statute, the “similarly situated” requirement is 
drawn by analogy from Equal Protection jurisprudence. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006) 
(“No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that treats a 
religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1229 (11th Cir. 
2004) (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)). 
 42. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 264. 
 43. Id. at 266. The court stated that to establish a violation of the RLUIPA Equal 
Terms provision the plaintiff “must show (1) it is a religious assembly or institution, (2) subject 
to a land use regulation, which regulation (3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal 
terms with (4) a nonreligious assembly or institution (5) that causes no lesser harm to the 
interests the regulation seeks to advance.” Id. at 270. The first four elements of an equal terms 
cause of action under the Third Circuit’s test are identical to the test in the Eleventh Circuit. 
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that the city’s land use plan did not violate RLUIPA even though it 
did not allow a church to locate in the downtown business district. 
The city’s goal in adopting the plan was to “achieve redevelopment 
of an underdeveloped and underutilized segment of the City.”44 The 
court reasoned that churches are not similarly situated to the secular 
organizations and assemblies allowed by the plan in light of the 
plan’s goals and aims.45 
By contrast, the Midrash court seems to take inconsistent 
positions on whether a similarly situated comparator is required at 
all. On the one hand, the Midrash court expressly stated that the 
equal terms provision “lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement 
usually found in equal protection analysis.”46 At the same time, the 
court seemed to inadvertently invoke the similarly situated 
comparator analysis in concluding that the Town of Surfside violated 
RLUIPA.47 Putting aside these inconsistencies, it is clear that it gave 
no consideration to the town’s regulatory goals in determining 
whether the synagogues were similarly situated to other assemblies 
allowed to locate in the business district. Instead, the opinion sought 
to determine whether a violation occurred by exploring the 
boundaries of key terms used in RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.48 
According to the court, the plain meaning of “assembly” is a “group 
gathered for a common purpose.”49 Under this natural, though 
broad, definition, the city’s disparate treatment of a synagogue, 
which was not allowed in the business district, and a private club, 
 
Id. (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 
1295, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)). 
 44. Id. at 270.  
 45. Id. at 270–71. 
 46.  Id. at 1229 (“[W]hile § (b)(1) has the ‘feel’ of an equal protection law, it lacks the 
‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal protection analysis.”). 
 47.  Id. at 1231 (“Finding that private clubs and lodges are similarly situated to churches 
and synagogues, we turn to whether under RLUIPA, Surfside may treat them differently.”). 
Despite the court’s baffling language, it is clear that even if Midrash is read in light of later 
Eleventh Circuit cases to require a “similarly situated” comparator, see infra note 52, then it 
must also be read to define that requirement so broadly as to remove from it much meaning. 
 48. Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. The Third Circuit characterized the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach as an application of the “natural perimeter” test developed by Justice Harlan 
in Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Under that test “a regulation is considered 
neutral and presumptively valid . . . if its ‘circumference . . . encircles a class so broad that it can 
be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural 
perimeter.’” Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 267 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 696 (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (second ellipses in original)). 
 49.  Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1231. 
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which was allowed, violated RLUIPA.50 Thus, as another court 
noted, the effect of the Midrash court’s rule is that “where private 
clubs are allowed, so must churches be.”51 
Later Eleventh Circuit cases have slightly modified the court’s 
original stance to expressly require a similarly situated comparator in 
some circumstances.52 For example, in Konikov v. Orange County, 
the court apparently limited Midrash by requiring a similarly situated 
secular comparator where a church brought an as-applied challenge 
to a statute.53 As a result, even the Eleventh Circuit seemingly 
restricts its otherwise expansive view of the RLUIPA equal terms 
provision by requiring identification of a favored similarly situated 
secular comparator for a plaintiff to prove that the government is 
selectively enforcing a facially neutral statute.54 
IV. THE COURT’S DECISION 
In Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County 
Commissioners,55 the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial 
of the county’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, effectively 
 
 50. Id. The court referred approvingly to the town’s definition of “private club” as “a 
building and facilities or premises, owned and operated by a corporation, association, person or 
persons for social, educational or recreational purposes, but not primarily for profit and not 
primarily to render a service which is customarily carried on as a business.” Id. (quoting 
SURFSIDE, FLA., ZONING ORDINANCE § 90-2(20)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 51. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 369 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
 52. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005); see also 
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 383–84 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 268. The 
Midrash court itself seems to take inconsistent positions on whether a “similarly situated” 
comparator is required. Compare Midrash, 366 F.3d. at 1229 (“[W]hile § (b)(1) has the ‘feel’ 
of an equal protection law, it lacks the ‘similarly situated’ requirement usually found in equal 
protection analysis.”), with id. at 1231 (“Finding that private clubs and lodges are similarly 
situated to churches and synagogues, we turn to whether under RLUIPA, Surfside may treat 
them differently.”). Despite the court’s baffling language, it is clear that even if Midrash is read 
in light of later Eleventh Circuit cases to require a “similarly situated” comparator, then it must 
also be read to define that requirement so broadly as to remove from it much meaning. 
 53. See Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327–29. 
 54. See id.; River of Life, 611 F.3d at 384 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“In an as-applied 
‘selective enforcement’ claim, however, the [Konikov court] held that an equal-terms plaintiff 
will generally be required to identify a similarly situated nonreligious assembly or institution 
that was treated more favorably.” (citing Primera Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. 
v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006))). 
 55. 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (2011). 
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sustaining the jury’s conclusion that the county’s denial of RMCC’s 
special use application violated RLUIPA.56 
A. Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Because of the procedural posture of the case, the Tenth Circuit 
applied the highly deferential “sufficiency of the evidence” standard 
in reviewing the district court proceedings.57 Under this standard, 
the court could overturn denial of the county’s motion only if it 
concluded that when “‘viewed in the light most favorable to the 
non-moving party, the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from it point but one way, in favor of the moving party.’”58 
As a result, the county bore the burden to show that no reasonable 
inference supported the jury’s verdict. The court clearly stated its 
intention to avoid weighing the credibility of witnesses or other 
evidence, challenging the factual conclusions of the jury, or 
otherwise substituting its judgment for the jury’s.59 
B. The Court’s Discussion of RLUIPA’s Substantive Provisions 
The court discussed the merits of the county’s arguments on 
only two of RLUIPA’s substantive provisions: the equal terms and 
the unreasonable limitations provisions. The court affirmed the 
permanent injunction entered against the city on those two prongs 
of the jury’s verdict, which obviated the need to “review the 
sufficiency of the evidence of the substantial burden claim.”60 The 
county also preserved a constitutional challenge to RLUIPA’s 
substantial burden provision, but failed to do so regarding the other 
provisions because it failed to adequately brief those issues.61 Because 
the permanent injunction could be sustained on grounds of the 
equal terms and the unreasonable limitations provisions, the court 
declined to reach the county’s constitutional challenge based on the 
substantial burden provision. The court reasoned that it generally 
“wish[es] to avoid, when possible, deciding constitutional questions 
 
 56. Id. at 1233. 
 57. Id. at 1235–36. 
 58. Id. at 1235 (quoting Praseuth v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 406 F.3d 1245, 1250 (10th 
Cir. 2005)). 
 59. See, e.g., id. at 1235–36, 1239. 
 60. Id. at 1239. 
 61. Id. 
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and thereby overturn legislative enactments and etch in stone rules of 
law beyond the reach of most democratic process.”62 
1. The court’s equal terms analysis 
On appeal, the county made two important arguments 
challenging the district court ruling. First, it argued that “RMCC 
did not present sufficient evidence for the jury to find that it violated 
RLUIPA’s equal terms provision.”63 Second, it argued that it was 
entitled to an affirmative defense because the Comprehensive Plan—
and, hence, the regulation of RMCC—was rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental interest.64 
The county’s first argument struck at the heart of the similarly 
situated comparator issue. At trial, RMCC pointed to Dawson 
School, a neighboring facility that successfully applied to the county 
for expansion in 1995.65 Both parties presented evidence attempting 
to emphasize either the school’s similarity or dissimilarity to RMCC. 
The county argued that the school’s expansion was “half the size of 
RMCC’s in terms of raw square footage,” that RMCC proposed a 
dramatic expansion of one building rather than expansions to several 
smaller buildings, and that the traffic caused by RMCC would 
exceed the school’s by ten times.66 On the other hand, RMCC 
testified that both proposals would have allowed facilities to expand 
to around 200,000 square feet, both resulted in identical expansions 
of the number of students served, and both were sited on 
“agricultural lands of importance.”67 The evidence presented by the 
parties allowed the reviewing court to conclude easily that 
“[a]lthough the two proposed expansions were not identical, the 
many substantial similarities allow for a reasonable jury to conclude 
that RMCC and Dawson School were similarly situated.”68 
The court also easily dispensed with the county’s affirmative 
defense/scrutiny argument. Without deciding whether or not 
RLUIPA even allows courts to inquire as to the government’s 
 
 62. Id. (quoting United States v. Cardenas-Alatorre, 485 F.3d 1111, 1115 n.9 (10th 
Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 63. Id. at 1236. 
 64. Id. at 1237. 
 65. Id. at 1236–37. 
 66. Id. at 1236. 
 67. Id. at 1236–37. 
 68. Id. at 1237. 
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justification for a non-neutral statute, the court concluded that 
where a statute is discriminatorily applied the rule is “subject to strict 
scrutiny, not rational basis review.”69 Because the court had already 
concluded that the county treated RMCC less favorably than a 
similarly situated comparator, the Comprehensive Plan was applied 
non-neutrally and had to withstand strict scrutiny.70 The county did 
not argue that it enjoyed a “strict scrutiny defense” and thus waived 
the argument.71 
2. The court’s unreasonable limitations analysis 
Citing only to RLUIPA’s mandate that a land-use regulation 
may not totally exclude or place unreasonable limitations on a 
religious assembly in a given jurisdiction, the court concluded that 
the evidence at trial “was more than adequate for a reasonable jury 
to find for RMCC on this claim.”72 Despite evidence that the county 
had approved several other churches’ permits, the court emphasized 
testimony from several witnesses that revealed a general animus 
against churches in applying for special use applications.73 The record 
also revealed specific opposition to RMCC’s efforts to “appease the 
County’s concerns” and other actions by the county that appeared to 
be designed to prolong the process and increase costs for RMCC.74 
Together, these instances would support a jury finding of specific 
discriminatory limitations the county sought to impose against 
RMCC.75 Thus, the court upheld the district court’s conclusion that 
the county’s implementation of the land use regulation unreasonably 
limited RMCC.76 
 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 1237–38. 
 71. Id. at 1238. 
 72. Id. at 1238–39 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006)). 
 73. Id. at 1238. One county commissioner even reportedly said, “[T]here will never be 
another mega church . . . in Boulder County.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 74. Id. at 1238–39. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 1239. 
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Although Rocky Mountain demonstrates a straightforward 
application of RLUIPA’s equal terms and unreasonable limitations 
provisions, its precedential value will be limited for two reasons. 
First, the case’s procedural posture required the court to give great 
deference to the jury’s findings. This deference, coupled with the 
county’s failure to adequately preserve the constitutional issue and 
properly raise the affirmative defense/scrutiny issue for those 
provisions, allowed the court to sidestep complicated legal issues and 
simply review findings of fact that it concluded it was obligated to 
uphold. Second, the court refused to adopt either the Third or 
Eleventh Circuit position on whether RLUIPA’s equal terms 
provision requires evaluation of a similarly situated secular 
comparator. The result of the court’s willingness to punt (or bide its 
time) is that this case will likely remain an outlier, providing little 
guidance for a future court’s attempt to sort out the “similarly 
situated” question. 
A. The Case’s Posture and Lawyering Diminished Rocky Mountain’s 
Precedential Value 
At the outset, it is clear that the court correctly decided the equal 
terms and unreasonable limitations claims, given the heavy deference 
it was obligated to give to the trial court findings. What is less clear is 
how much difference it would have made had the case come up on 
summary judgment, or even on a motion to dismiss. While the 
intricacies of the civil procedure questions are beyond the scope of 
this Note, they will be important as future judges and practitioners 
attempt to apply Rocky Mountain. Some of the precedential value of 
the case is lost simply because so few cases proceed to trial, and 
Rocky Mountain seemed to turn on the testimony of witnesses 
revealing animus against expansion by RMCC and other churches.77 
This is especially clear in the court’s review of the claim that the 
county placed unreasonable limitations on RMCC. The jury 
instructions simply required jurors to determine whether the 
county’s regulation deprived RMCC and others of “reasonable 
 
 77. See, e.g., id. at 1238–39 (emphasizing the conflicting testimony surrounding 
RMCC’s efforts to appease the county and the county’s apparent determination to oppose the 
proposed expansion). 
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opportunities to practice their religion.”78 It is easy to imagine that 
same question coming before a court as a question of law on 
undisputed facts. Obviously, the court’s discussion and deference to 
the trial court will provide little guidance to a lower court in 
determining what “unreasonably limits” a religious entity.79 
Even more important than the court’s review of the trial court’s 
findings, the county’s failure to adequately raise several key 
arguments allowed the court to sidestep some important and 
unresolved issues.80 The most important of these was whether the 
county was entitled to an affirmative defense that would have 
allowed the action to stand so long as it passed strict scrutiny. The 
court’s conclusion that the county’s regulation was neither neutral 
nor generally applicable should have come as no surprise to the 
county. In 2006, the Tenth Circuit made clear that it favors “a fact-
specific inquiry to determine . . . whether the facts support an 
argument that the challenged rule is applied in a discriminatory 
fashion that disadvantages religious groups or organizations.”81 Such 
discrimination, coupled with “‘a pattern of ad hoc discretionary 
decisions’” may amount to “a system of individualized exemptions 
triggering strict scrutiny.”82 In Rocky Mountain, where the county 
knew that the finder of fact had already identified discriminatory 
 
 78. Id. at 1238 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006). Of course, it is possible that the statute’s 
language was meant to allow the courts to give content to the reasonableness standard through 
incremental, ad hoc judicial process. However, because the court did not have occasion to 
determine whether the county’s actions constituted an unreasonable limitation as a matter of 
law, Rocky Mountain will be of little use in such a process. 
 80. One of these issues is the constitutionality of RLUIPA. A number of courts have 
already considered whether RLUIPA passes constitutional muster. They have overwhelmingly 
answered that question in the affirmative. See, e.g., Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of 
Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353–56 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality 
in face of Fourteenth Amendment, Establishment Clause, Commerce Clause, and Tenth 
Amendment challenges); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1235–
43 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding RLUIPA’s constitutionality when challenged on 
Establishment Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, and Tenth Amendment grounds); 
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding RLUIPA’s 
constitutionality in the face of Spending Clause, Establishment Clause, federalism arguments, 
and other constitutional challenges). Because the Rocky Mountain court correctly concluded 
that constitutional review was not warranted in this case, the corresponding lack of guidance to 
lower courts on this issue is both appropriate and self-evident.  
 81. Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643, 651 (10th 
Cir. 2006).  
 82. Id. at 653 (quoting Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1299 (10th Cir. 
2004)). 
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animus on the county’s part, it could have easily argued that the 
court should at least allow the county to demonstrate a compelling 
governmental interest. Of course, demonstrating that the county’s 
regulation was narrowly tailored to advance this compelling 
governmental interest would likely have been impossible.83 
Nevertheless, this case serves as a lesson to future advocates by 
illustrating RLUIPA’s fertile ground for interpretive arguments and 
providing a cautionary tale to attorneys seeking to raise (and 
preserve) the proper issues.  
Fortunately, there is little in the Rocky Mountain opinion that 
suggests that the court would resolve the affirmative defense 
question in favor of the Eleventh Circuit approach, and advocates 
should hesitate to rely on the court adopting this approach in the 
future. Courts and commentators alike have criticized the Eleventh 
Circuit’s strict scrutiny gloss.84 Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s stated 
rationale, the Midrash approach essentially attempts to remedy one 
interpretive error with another. To begin with, this approach first 
gives an unnecessarily broad definition of “assembly” and 
“institution,” which are key RLUIPA terms.85 This broad definition 
fosters a real danger that religious institutions will be immunized 
from local zoning ordinances. For example, if a private club—an 
assembly—could locate in a business district, a church must be 
allowed as well unless the court allows the government some way to 
rationalize its exclusion. That will be possible only if RLUIPA allows 
the court to scrutinize the government’s objectives. As such, the 
Eleventh Circuit has read a “compelling governmental interest” test 
 
 83. See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing strict scrutiny as “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact”). But see 
Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in 
the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 797 (2006) (“Contrary to the Gunther myth, laws 
can (and do) survive strict scrutiny with considerable frequency.”). Even Winkler acknowledges 
in his empirical study of the application of strict scrutiny that local laws limiting the free 
exercise of religion, when applied in a discriminatory manner, “are invariably overturned.” Id. 
at 796–97, 830–31, 857–62. 
 84. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the Third Circuit’s criticism that addition of the 
strict scrutiny analysis to the equal terms provision ignores congressional intent to establish a 
“clear divide” between the test for equal terms and the test of substantial burden). 
 85. As noted above, the Eleventh Circuit defined “assembly” as “a group gathered for a 
common purpose” and “institution” as “‘an established society or corporation: an 
establishment or foundation esp. of a public character.’” Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31 
(quoting WEBSTER’S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1171 (1993)). 
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into the equal terms provision merely to attempt to cabin its first 
interpretive mistake. Thus, the most appropriate way to characterize 
the Eleventh Circuit’s stance is an unnecessary mechanism to assure 
that the court’s expansive application of the equal terms provision 
does not “overprotect religious assembles [sic] in comparison to 
their closest secular counterparts.”86  
If faced with a situation more closely analogous to Midrash or 
Lighthouse, discussed above, the court should instead adopt the strict 
liability scheme supported by the actual language of RLUIPA and 
favored by the Third Circuit. Although this would also threaten to 
“overprotect religious assemblies” if left unchecked, the court could 
then cabin the possible claims under the equal terms provision by 
requiring the government to treat assemblies and institutions on 
equal terms only in light of the government’s regulatory purpose or 
goals.87 It could do so by either adopting the Third Circuit’s 
similarly situated rule in Lighthouse, or by adopting a substantially 
similar standard. Under such an approach, our hypothetical church 
and club would not be similarly situated comparators because a 
church does more violence to the government’s stated goal of 
economic development. But, if the government allowed some other 
secular assembly or institution that posed a similar threat to the 
government’s regulatory purpose—such as the headquarters for a 
political party—excluding the church would violate RLUIPA’s equal 
terms provision. 
B. Giving Effect to RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision Through 
Similarly Situated Comparators 
The court’s analysis in Rocky Mountain leaves its stance on the 
similarly situated issue unclear. The court seems to assume, without 
deciding, that a similarly situated comparator was necessary in this 
case. Yet the court prudently gave no indication on how it might 
decide the similarly situated question in future cases. The above 
discussion demonstrates that Midrash and Lighthouse offer two 
contrasting approaches to interpreting RLUIPA’s equal terms 
 
 86. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 370–71 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“There is no textual basis for the [strict scrutiny] gloss, and religious 
discrimination is expressly prohibited elsewhere in the statute. The gloss was needed only to 
solve a problem of the court’s own creation.”). 
 87. See Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
266 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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provision, both weighing in on the affirmative defense and 
comparator issues. Although the Third Circuit’s Lighthouse approach 
is more logically and textually sound, especially in cases like Rocky 
Mountain, each approach has its ardent supporters and detractors.88 
While the court will eventually need to evaluate these approaches 
and either adopt one of them or devise its own, Rocky Mountain was 
not the appropriate case to do so for two reasons. 
First, the case would have come out the same either way. Under 
the Eleventh Circuit’s unrefined Midrash approach, Dawson School 
would certainly have qualified as an “institution” under the plain 
meaning of that word.89 Because Dawson School was allowed to 
expand and RMCC was not, the county violated the equal terms 
provision. This is even truer under the Eleventh Circuit’s later 
Konikov case, which would probably require a similarly situated 
comparator in an as-applied challenge anyway.90 Likewise, under the 
Third Circuit’s Lighthouse standard—which will find an assembly or 
institution similarly situated only in light of its comparative impact 
on the government’s regulatory purpose—the county would have a 
hard time showing that Dawson School was not similarly situated. At 
the trial court level, the jury resolved this question in favor of 
RMCC.91 However, even if the relevant facts had been undisputed, 
Dawson School was almost certainly similarly situated as a matter of 
law because the county’s stated purpose was to maintain the rural 
character of the district and avoid over-intensive use.92 In light of this 
regulatory purpose, the two institutions were at least equally 
harmful. Thus, the county violated the equal terms provision by 
treating Dawson School more favorably. 
 
 88. See, e.g., River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370. In River of Life, decided a few months after 
Rocky Mountain, Judge Posner criticized the Lighthouse approach as relying too heavily on the 
government’s subjective statement of “regulatory purpose,” which is too easy to manipulate. 
Id. at 371. Judge Posner favored a similar test, but would rely on an ordinance’s “regulatory 
criteria,” which he contends are more objective. Id. see also id. at 374 (Cudahy, J., concurring) 
(“I see little real contrast in basic approach or result between the Third Circuit and the 
majority analysis . . . .”). Judge Sykes, dissenting in River of Life, rejected both the Third 
Circuit approach and the majority’s modification, favoring instead the Eleventh Circuit 
approach, “with some elaboration.” Id. at 377 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 89. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1230–31. 
 90. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 91. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 
1235–36 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 92. See id. at 1233. 
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Advocates briefing these issues in the future may be tempted to 
argue that Rocky Mountain demonstrates the Tenth Circuit’s implicit 
adoption of the Third Circuit’s similarly situated approach. Indeed, 
the court’s discussion of which facts were relevant at the trial level 
seems to indicate that the surrounding area’s designation as an 
agricultural district, and the regulatory purposes accompanying that 
distinction, were considered when the jury decided that Dawson 
School and RMCC were similarly situated.93 However, such a 
reading of Rocky Mountain makes more of this case than the text 
supports. Rather, the case should be read to reveal nothing more 
than understandable hesitation to adopt a test ill-suited to this type 
of case. As this Note demonstrates, resolving the circuit split on 
either the scrutiny or similarly situated issues would likely require 
resolution of both issues. Legally significant factual dissimilarities 
between Rocky Mountain and the other cases addressing these issues 
makes this set of facts a poor arena to hash out these important 
questions. Unlike both Midrash and Lighthouse, which considered 
facial challenges to ordinances that excluded churches from a given 
zoning district,94 Rocky Mountain addressed a challenge to the 
county’s unequal application of the existing scheme.95 Given the as-
applied nature of this case, the Eleventh/Third Circuit split provides 
essentially an illusory distinction.96 Thus, adopting either circuit’s 
approach, while it may have fostered greater prospective clarity, 
would have forced the court into this divisive issue without it making 
a meaningful difference to the outcome of the case at hand.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The court’s opinion in Rocky Mountain alluded to two of the 
most important issues surrounding application of RLUIPA. The 
case’s procedural posture and the issues and arguments briefed by 
the county, however, limited the precedential impact of the decision. 
Further, the opinion seems to indicate the court’s prudent 
 
 93. See id. at 1236–37. 
 94. See Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 
257–58 (3d Cir. 2007); Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1219–20. 
 95. See Rocky Mountain, 605 F.3d at 1236.  
 96. This is because the Eleventh Circuit’s Konikov decision would require a similarly 
situated comparator in as-applied cases, as discussed above. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 
F.3d 1317, 1327–29 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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willingness to bide its time and not rush into the similarly situated or 
scrutiny questions where the case’s facts do not favor resolution of 
the issues. Thus, although Rocky Mountain could have done more to 
provide prospective guidance to lower courts, it instead merely set 
the stage for future parties to press the court to adopt one of the 
existing rules or devise one of its own. 
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